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3. Loose but not Lost! Four Challenges for the 
EU in the Aftermath of the British Referendum 
Sandra Schwindenhammer 
 
Just a few months ago, I was strongly convinced that the 
Brexit is not a realistic scenario. However, reality has caught 
up with me and with the European Union. The victory of the 
British Leave campaign on 23 June 2016 is a historic moment 
not only for the UK, but also for the EU’s remaining 27 
Member States. The future impact of the British referendum 
will depend on the new relationship between the UK and the 
EU. In this chapter, I will focus on some procedural, 
substantial, strategic and normative challenges the Brexit 
poses to European governance. I argue that the EU has to 
face four key challenges in the short and medium term in the 
aftermath of the British referendum: 
1. Dealing with procedural uncertainty under Article 50 
2. Dealing with substantial uncertainty 
3. Preventing Britain becoming the first domino 
4. Dealing with the enduring legitimacy crisis and new 
nationalisms 
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Challenge 1: Dealing with Procedural Uncertainty 
under Article 50 
According to Article 50.1 of the Treaty on the European Union 
‘any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union 
in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ (EU 
2012a, 43). One might arguably state that, at first sight, 
Article 50 is unambiguous and clear. The procedural 
requirements for withdrawal comprise three steps and the 
involvement of several European institutions (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Source: European Parliament 2016, 4. 
Although Article 50 sets down the procedural requirements 
for withdrawal, the process after the British referendum to 
the establishment of a new relationship between the UK and 
the EU will be prolonged and highly uncertain. Applying 
findings from the European Parliaments Briefing in February 
2016, I argue that the legal framework under Article 50 
involves several veto points that make the withdrawal 
procedure highly unpredictable and uncertain. Veto points 
emerge from political institutions whose members are able to 
block attempts at policy change. They can arise from 
structures that are exogenous to the executive-legislative 
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relationship, such as judicial review or federalism, or from 
specific features of individual political systems, e.g. 
bicameralism (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 26). Veto points 
vary widely across political systems. The more veto points 
exist, the more difficult it is to achieve a common policy 
outcome. 
In the first step, the withdrawal process has to be initiated by 
a notification from the Member State wishing to withdraw to 
the European Council (European Parliament 2016, 3). This is 
what everybody in Brussels is presently waiting for. The 
timing of this notification is, however, entirely in the hand of 
the UK. On 2nd October 2016, Prime Minister Theresa May 
confirmed that she will trigger Article 50 by ‘the first quarter 
of 2017’. This decision corresponds with earlier statements on 
the UK’s likely timetable and preparatory work for Brexit by 
David Davies who is in charge of negotiating Britain’s 
withdrawal from the EU: 
The negotiating strategy has to be properly designed, and 
there is some serious consultation to be done first. 
Constitutional propriety requires us to consult with the Scots, 
Welsh, and Northern Irish governments first, and common 
sense implies that we should consult with stakeholders […]. 
This whole process should be completed to allow triggering 
of Article 50 before or by the beginning of next year. 
Prior to formal notification, Article 50 allows informal 
discussions between the country wishing to withdraw and 
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other Member States or EU institutions. However, it is 
unlikely that this will happen. In late June 2016, the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, along with the French President 
François Hollande and Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, 
insisted that there will be no formal or informal talks about 
the British withdrawal until the UK has officially triggered 
Article 50. Thus, it will also take some time until the European 
Council will provide the guidelines for the negotiations 
between the EU and the UK with the aim of concluding an 
agreement setting out concrete withdrawal arrangements. 
These arrangements should cover the departing Member 
State’s future relationship with the EU (European Parliament 
2016, 3). 
The EU and the UK have a timeframe of two years to agree 
on these arrangements. After that, membership ends 
automatically, unless the European Council and the Member 
State concerned jointly decide to extend this period 
(European Parliament 2016, 4). The two-year time period has 
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, one might 
argue that a two-year period allows for a cooling off. On the 
other hand, the time span leads to uncertainty and potential 
blackmailing (Rieder 2013, 157). According to Friel (2004, 
426), the two-year rule might enable the larger Member 
States to control the process of withdrawal to their own 
benefit, perhaps even using the threat of withdrawal to force 
concessions from the other Member States, knowing that 
any putative withdrawal could itself be withdrawn before the 
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two-year time period has expired. I assume that the two-year 
time-frame will either be extended, or, since the UK knows 
that withdrawal will take effect in any case after two years, 
the negotiations will not be characterised by strong attempts 
to find consensus until summer 2019. 
Step two of the formal withdrawal process involves the 
European Commission making recommendations to the 
Council to open negotiations with the UK. Before concluding 
an agreement in step three, the Council will need to obtain 
the European Parliament’s consent (European Parliament 
2016, 4). It should be noted that, whilst the British members 
of the European Council and of the Council will not participate 
in the discussions or decisions concerning the UK’s 
withdrawal, no similar provision exists for Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) elected in the UK. Although 
British MEPs have to represent the collective interests of all 
European citizens, I assume that national loyalties will prevail 
in this case. 
The Council has to conclude the withdrawal agreement with 
a so-called ‘super qualified majority’ (without the 
participation of the UK). According to Article 238.3(b) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the super 
qualified majority rule is only applied in the few cases when 
the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission 
or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (EU 2012b, 153-154). The super 
qualified majority is defined as at least 72 per cent of the 
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members of the Council, comprising at least 65 per cent of 
the population of the Member States (without the 
withdrawing state) (European Parliament 2016, 4). The future 
will show in how far the super qualified majority rule will 
impact the withdrawal process. Unlike the accession of new 
Member States, the withdrawal of a Member State does not 
require national ratification by the remaining members 
(European Parliament 2016, 4). However, any treaty change 
or international agreement, such as a free trade agreement, 
that might become necessary with Brexit, will need to be 
ratified by the remaining 27 Member States. Whether this will 
happen, I am not sure. All in all, there are too many veto 
points to allow for a reliable forecast of the procedure under 
Article 50. 
 
Challenge 2: Dealing with Substantial Uncertainty 
Article 50 does not establish any substantial conditions for a 
Member State to be able to exercise its right to withdrawal. 
There is a huge lack of clarity over what will replace British EU 
membership, especially with regard to the UK’s future Single 
Market access. To what extent will free trade and labour 
mobility between the UK and the EU continue? Will London 
still be Europe’s leading finance centre? These are only two of 
the numerous questions concerning European economies. 
Economists have done some research on future-scenarios 
and the potential impact of Brexit on the UK-EU economic 
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relationship (see i.e. Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 5 et seq.; 
Global Counsel 2015, 6). 
The authors differentiate several models. Under a scenario 
that resembles the EU-Norway relationship (Norwegian-style 
model), the UK joins the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
maintains full access to the Single Market, but must adopt EU 
standards and regulations. Although EEA members belong to 
the Single Market, they are not part of deeper European 
integration. For example, as an EEA member Norway does 
not belong to the EU’s customs union. This means Norwegian 
exports must satisfy ‘rules of origin’ requirements to enter the 
EU duty-free (Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 5). The Norwegian-
style model would not give the UK the political flexibility to 
justify Brexit. The UK would have to continue to pay billions 
in contributions to the EU without having a say in shaping the 
rules of the Single Market. 
The Turkish-style customs union model avoids internal tariff 
barriers, with the UK adopting many EU product market 
regulations (Global Counsel 2016, 6). However, sector 
coverage would be incomplete and the UK would be required 
to implement EU external tariffs without guaranteed access 
to third markets. By contrast, the much looser most-favoured 
nation model implies that the UK’s trade with the EU would 
only be governed by rules of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) (Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 7). The most-favoured 
nation model will likely be applied when the UK and the EU 
cannot agree upon any specific economic arrangement. The 
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model would give flexibility, but is likely to jeopardise trade 
and investment (Global Counsel 2016, 6). The UK’s exports to 
the EU and other WTO members would be subject to the 
importing countries’ most-favoured nation tariffs. This would 
raise the cost of exporting to the EU for UK firms (Ottaviano 
et al. 2014). 
The most likely models are either the Swiss-style model of 
bilateral accords governing access to specific sectors of the 
Single Market or the comprehensive FTA-based model (Free 
Trade Agreement) (Global Counsel 2016, 4). Under the Swiss-
style model, the UK and the EU would agree a set of bilateral 
accords which regulate UK access to the Single Market in 
specific sectors. However, the EU would be under no 
obligation to serve the UK everything on the menu, which 
means that the Swiss model would not provide the same 
guarantee of market access that EU or EEA membership offer 
(Dhingra and Sampson 2016, 6). 
Under the FTA-based model, the UK would be free to agree 
FTAs independently and the UK’s relationship with the EU is 
itself governed by an FTA. Both models – the Swiss-style 
model of bilateral accords and a comprehensive FTA-based 
model – would require prolonged negotiation followed by 
compromises and may still impose costs. According to 
Ottaviano et al. (2014, 3), trade costs after the UK leaving the 
EU will likely increase because of (i) higher tariff barriers 
between the UK and the EU, (ii) higher non-tariff barriers to 
trade (arising from different regulations, border controls, 
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etc.) between the UK and the EU, and (iii) non-participation 
of the UK in future steps that the EU takes towards deeper 
integration reducing non-tariff barriers. The last aspect is 
particularly important when we think of the ongoing TTIP 
negotiations and the question what role the UK still has to 
play in this process.  
In early October 2016, Theresa May emphasised that the UK’s 
negotiations with the EU will be based on ‘the freedom to 
make our own decisions on a whole host of different matters, 
from how we label our food to the way in which we choose to 
control immigration’. In this regard she rejected the 
Norwegian-style model and the Swiss-style model: ‘It is not, 
therefore, a negotiation to establish a relationship anything 
like the one we have had for the last 40 years or more. So it is 
not going to be a Norway model. It’s not going to be a 
Switzerland model. It is going to be an agreement between 
an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the 
European Union’. The future will show to what extent 
Theresa May’s insistence on the principles of sovereignty and 
independence will hinder, and not enhance, a viable long-
term solution that guarantees the free movement of goods 
and services between the UK and the EU. I assume that the 
UK’s future Single Market access will be a long, uncertain and 
maybe costly journey, taking not two years, but ten years or 
more. In this regard, I am not as optimistic as David Davis 
(2016) who said on the UK’s future access to the Single 
Market: 
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The ideal outcome, (and in my view the most likely, after a lot 
of wrangling) is continued tariff-free access. Once the 
European nations realise that we are not going to budge on 
control of our borders, they will want to talk, in their own 
interest. There may be some complexities about rules of 
origin and narrowly-based regulatory compliance for exports 
into the EU, but that is all manageable. 
 
Challenge 3: Preventing Britain Becoming the First 
Domino 
The third challenge refers to the potential domino effect 
threatening the European unity. Immediately after the British 
referendum, right-wing political leaders, such as Dutch 
politician Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, the head of 
France’s Front National, called for their own votes on EU 
membership. The rise of right-wing populism fuels 
Eurosceptic positions. Negative positions towards 
immigrants and the bureaucratic EU elites, who, allegedly, do 
not listen to the concerns of ordinary people, can be found 
among all right-wing parties’ programmes in Europe 
(Rooduijn 2015). Right-wing political leaders take advantage 
of the rising resentment over the fallout from globalisation 
which has widened the gap between the rich and the poor. 
They present themselves as the voice of Eurosceptic citizens 
and argue that the European political elite is arrogant, selfish, 
incompetent and corrupt (Rooduijn 2015, 4 et seq.). 
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Indeed, Euroscepticism provides a strong rational for 
European citizens to vote for right-wing parties (Werts et al. 
2012). Since many mainstream parties today only offer 
positive or appeasing messages towards European 
integration, citizens who are Eurosceptic, often have little 
other option than to vote for parties on the fringes of the 
political spectrum (Rooduijn 2015, 4). Is there currently a 
realistic threat of a ‘Frexit’ or a ‘Nexit’ posed by right-wing 
parties in Europe? I do not think that a majority of the 
national citizens in France and the Netherlands would also 
decide to leave the EU. It seems more likely that the EU will 
take a tough stance in the negotiations with the UK to set an 
example and prevent other countries to take the same path. 
Nevertheless, in order to stop right-wing populist parties 
from rising further, political discussions within and about 
Europe need to give a stronger voice to citizens that feel left 
behind. 
 
Challenge 4: Dealing with the Enduring Legitimacy 
Crisis and New Nationalisms 
From a more optimistic point of view, one might argue that 
the UK leaving the EU serves as a wakeup call. Brexit could be 
the salutary shock needed for change. Right after the British 
referendum, Angela Merkel said that it is now a ‘turning point 
for Europe’ and Francois Hollande suggested ‘to move 
forward; Europe cannot act as before’. The EU suffers a lack 
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in input and output legitimacy. Less and less citizens 
participate in European elections, and many doubt that the 
European Commission’s agenda benefits them. The 
institutional reforms that gradually endowed the European 
Parliament with more power have not managed to increase 
the EU’s political authority. The shift from the ‘permissive 
consensus’ to the ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009) jeopardises the EU’s legitimacy, hampers 
European integration and fuels Euroscepticism. 
Efforts of further European integration had been rejected 
before in national referendums. In 2008, the Irish voted 
against the Treaty of Lisbon, and in 1992, the Danish rejected 
the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In both 
cases, citizens were asked to vote again after the provision of 
national concessions and, finally, voted in favour of the EU 
treaties. The two referendums serve as illustrative examples 
of earlier setbacks in the European integration process. They 
also reveal an elite-public gap and indicate the growing 
impact of European citizens and public opinion. The rise of 
Euroscepticism among European citizens shows that 
previous efforts to solve the democratic deficit have had 
limited success. Most mainstream parties are more Euro-
supportive than voters and still resist politicising the 
European integration issue (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 21). 
Eurosceptic parties on the populist right and radical left seem 
to be closer to the pulse of public opinion than mainstream 
parties. On the far left, opposition to European integration 
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expresses antipathy to capitalism; on the populist right, it 
expresses defense of national communities (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009, 21). Nationalism is rising along with negative 
public attitudes towards the EU, which put Member State 
politics under pressure (Schmidt 2015, 56). However, 
simplistic demands of regaining sovereignty and national 
control over policies ignore the fact that state capacities are 
systematically limited in times of globalisation. The golden 
age of statehood, ideally characterised by a complete overlap 
of its four basic dimensions – resources, law, legitimacy and 
welfare (Leibfried and Zürn 2005) – seems to be history. With 
its decline since the late 1970s, various functions traditionally 
ascribed to the nation state have dispersed into the 
international realm (internationalisation) and to new actors 
(privatisation) (Flohr et al. 2010, 4). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the procedural, substantial, 
strategic and normative challenges that Brexit poses in the 
short and medium term to European governance. From a 
procedural perspective (challenge 1), multiple veto points do 
not allow for a reliable forecast of the procedure under Article 
50. Moreover, the effectiveness of veto points highly depends 
on the extent to which a veto is complete, permanent and 
non-appealable (Weaver and Rockman 1993, 26). In the 
substantial dimension (challenge 2), the UK’s future Single 
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Market access will be a long and a costly journey. The UK’s 
‘continued tariff-free access’ (Davis 2016) to the Single 
Market after Brexit is still a long way off. We do not know how 
long it will take to come to an agreement and whether the 
Swiss-style model or the comprehensive FTA-based model will 
prevail. From a strategic perspective (challenge 3), the EU will 
likely take a tough stance in the negotiations with the UK to 
prevent other countries (e.g. France or the Netherlands) 
taking the same path. The most pressing and important 
challenge for the EU is to solve its enduring legitimacy crisis 
(challenge 4). 
In order to (re-)gain the support of the European public, the 
EU will have to protect, improve or create policies that 
contribute to more inclusiveness, transparency, fairness and 
accountability (input legitimacy) and to develop governance 
arrangements in a way that allow for more efficient and 
effective policy outcomes (output legitimacy) (Scharpf 1999). 
All in all, I agree with Vivian Schmidt (2015, 56) that there is 
still a window to solve the European legitimacy crisis and to 
respond to the rise of the new nationalisms – but it may not 
be open for long. As the EU legitimacy crisis continues and 
disillusionment grows, right-wing populism will become 
increasingly difficult to reverse. Subsequently, it will become 
harder to resolve the crisis with innovative ideas as 
polarisation will increase. Thus, to put it in a nutshell, the EU 
may be currently loose but it is still not lost! 
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